For nearly 20 years after the world has become aware of Iran’s secret and controversial nuclear program, there has been an ongoing debate on where to draw the line in the sand. The so-called “anti-war” camp, better described as the pro-appeasement camp, have long been pushing back the yardstick and literally encouraging the international community into inaction, while shaming critics as trigger-happy warmongers.
Such an atmosphere is exactly what Iran’s regime has been fueling and feeding off for the past two decades, justifying its measures parallel to buying time to advance its illicit nuclear [weapons] program. This further signals the flaws of the 2015 nuclear deal brokered by the Obama/Biden administration, allowing the regime to continue uranium enrichment alongside research and development.
The world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism and main exporter of Islamic fundamentalism/fanaticism cannot be trusted. The line in the sand should be no enrichment activities. Period.
A recent Foreign Affairs piece, “A Redline for Iran?” is one such example of how the pro-appeasement camp argues to continue the no-action policy vis-à-vis Iran, further pushing back the yardstick to now only asking Iran to refrain from 90 percent enrichment.
While this article was published on December 23, it was quite interesting to see Mohammad Eslami, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, claim just two days later that Iran will not enrich uranium over 60 percent if nuclear talks fail. Coincidence? I think not but let me explain.
“He's saying this because the regime knows what will happen if it starts enriching to 90 percent. But 60 percent enrichment represents about 99 percent of the enrichment work needed to produce weapons-grade uranium, so Iran is still gaining significant experience and knowledge even if it doesn't take that step,” tweeted Jason Brodsky, Middle East analyst and Policy Director of United Against Nuclear Iran.
In other words, the international community should simply trust Iran’s regime reaching the brink of nuclear weaponization and a hair’s breadth away from the 90 percent used for nuclear weapons, especially considering Tehran’s 43-year continuous show of goodwill measures to gain the world’s trust. Those who push such an agenda are either naïve, or suspicious, to say the least.
The mentioned Foreign Affairs article criticizes the Trump administration for leaving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal without acknowledging the long list of flaws in the deal. And without recognizing the fact that Iran has been violating the Obama/Biden deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), since day one. This is a typical, if not main characteristic of the “anti-war” (read pro-appeasement/inaction) camp.
Those who agree with such a mentality and train of thought quickly remind us that Iran would probably need a year or two to produce a missile-deliverable weapon, while distracting important attention away from the undeniable reality that those activities would be much harder to detect and stop because they are not tracked by inspectors. Again, we’re not talking about the Netherlands here. This is Iran, the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism and exporter of Islamic fundamentalism/fanaticism.
To prepare the reader’s mind for a weak threshold, the writers of the Foreign Affairs peace first argue that setting thresholds can be tricky, politicians don’t like being boxed in by such limitations, and “nonproliferation redlines often contain weaknesses that encourage proliferators to advance toward the bomb while banking on escaping punishment—a hallmark of Iran’s nuclear strategy to date.”
They cite how Obama failed to follow through on a redline he set for the Assad regime in Syria regarding the use of chemical weapons and Ronald Reagan’s 1980s threat to cut off aid to Pakistan if it continued enriching uranium and surpassing the five percent mark.
What the pro-appeasement camp will not tell you, of course, is where we would be if Obama and Reagan had actually enforced those red lines. The Assad regime would have been stopped from killing tens of thousands of more innocent civilians and one less country would have nuclear weapons. The pro-appeasement camp is always ready to portray an extremely weak and incapable image of the U.S., constantly arguing the choice is between war or no war, and extensively speaking out against economic sanctions that target tyrannical regimes. Again, making their actions all the more suspicious.
Listen to the tone:
“After all, what really distinguishes six percent from five percent? Redlines for Iran based on a certain number of centrifuges, or a specific amount of fissile material would probably run into similar problems.”
The reader is pushed into uncertainty, a sense of powerlessness, and thus accepting a current bad status quo over a possible worse situation in the future. As a result, inaction is the inevitable path forward. Apathy led to the loopholes in the 2015 nuclear deal and the current Biden administration refusing to actually impose sanctions imposed on Iran’s regime. Tehran is watching closely and has been taking advantage of such a weak approach for years.
The use of vague language is another tactic used by the pro-appeasement camp to confuse the reader and encourage them to the conclusion they desire. Here are a few examples:
—drawing the line at certain kinds of work on weaponization is problematic
—redlines can also be insufficiently precise, incomplete
—a redline against Iran assembling a nuclear weapon suffers from many problems at once (!)
“The term ‘nuclear weapon’ is itself imprecise: Does the device need to be fully assembled? Does it need to be mounted on a missile?”
The use of such dialect should sound alarm bells for all readers about the malign intentions of such pro-appeasement/non-action pieces written with ill intent.
Iran diverting enriched uranium from facilities where inspectors regularly visit might not be worth using force over. Again, the pro-appeasement writers install a sense of ambiguity and literally push the yardstick as far back as Iran having nuclear weapons. All these outlandish arguments are meant to groom the reader for an extremely weak and pro-Iran threshold. In the case of the Foreign Affairs piece and its authors, the world should only consider 90 percent enrichment as a red line.
These authors also advise against setting a redline on Iran building a “new covert enrichment facility,” arguing “if the facility were only under construction and contained no operational centrifuges or uranium, its discovery would likely not merit the use of military force.”
Of course, such pro-appeasement/inaction authors would never question why Iran, if they had nothing to hide and are worth completely trusting, should even have a cover enrichment facility? And why in the heart of a mountain, under 60 meters (200 ft) of dense earth? If Iran’s nuclear program is completely peaceful as they claim, why all the secrecy? Why uranium enrichment above 3.5%?
Wouldn’t it be far more logical for Iran to not spend billions of dollars on enormously expensive nuclear projects and raise mistrust among the international community, and instead gain trust by ending all such activities and simply importing the nuclear fuel needed for nuclear power plants just like many other countries? Especially when Obama was in power and now Biden is in office?
Here’s another example from the Foreign Affairs article of setting yardsticks back as far as possible:
“The best approach would aim to prevent Iran from producing weapons-grade materials: that is, 90 percent enriched uranium. If Iran did that, it would still need to weaponize the material and would not have a bomb in hand, but it would have completed the hardest part of building a weapon. At that point, it would be very difficult for the United States to roll back Iran’s program and prevent Iran from using that material for a weapon. In other words, if Iran successfully crosses the 90 percent threshold without any intervention, the United States would likely need to shift to preparing for a nuclear Iran rather than trying to prevent it.”
Here we are persuaded by the Foreign Affairs authors to accept Iranian calculations, as if there is anything one can trust coming from a regime that is hellbent on concealing its nuclear [weapons] program. Such communication is dangerous and must be avoided, as it only benefits Iran’s regime.
“… breakout timelines are estimates based on an array of constantly shifting technical factors. Iranian and U.S. calculations may well differ, leading to different perceptions about how close Iran is to any redline.”
The article goes one step further by lowering the level of inspections from “anywhere, anytime” as promised by JCPOA advocates, to UN inspectors visiting only “key facilities” and even pushing Iran’s talking points of “wouldn’t require Iran to dial back its nuclear program, which it sees as valuable leverage.” This is further proof that the pro-appeasement/inaction camp will stop at nothing, and literally voice/justify/rationalize Iran’s demands in Western media outlets. What else could the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism ask for?!
More such language in the mentioned article as the authors continue their vague narrative of arguments:
—drawing a clear redline with Iran is unwise
—drawing redlines backed by the threat of military action will doom diplomacy
And to save face, the authors, only at the very end of their 2200-word, argue “there is little evidence that threats of force would make negotiations impossible or that the threat of more sanctions would deter major nuclear provocations.” They go on to cite Obama—who’s appeasement policy is to blame for the current Iran nuclear crisis—to have routinely noted that “all options” are on the table.
What the authors can’t deny is that “today nearly every element of the Iranian economy is already cut off from the international system.” What they won’t mention is this is thanks to the Trump administration’s maximum pressure policy, that despite all the criticism is certain media outlets, was only in effect for around 18 months, while appeasement-style policies have been used in failure vis-à-vis Tehran for decades.
Jack Detsch @JackDetschNEW: Brian Hook's exit leaves Trump admin scrambling to snatch a victory on Iran. "Iran is breaking the JCPOA limits on enrichment & storage, so it will be super difficult to say it is working” a fmr sr admin official told @ForeignPolicy (w/ @RobbieGramer) https://t.co/s7KlX1ZjLk
With pro-appeasement camp upping their efforts these days we are literally hearing various “experts” arguing that they could live with a nuclear Iran. This does not end here as some even say the regime in Iran, ruled by the fanatic ayatollahs, would not resort to using nuclear weapons as it would lead to their annihilation.
There is no end in sight. Once Iran tests a nuclear weapon these pundits will claim it’s merely a test and Iran would never place a nuclear warhead upon a ballistic missile and target a country such as Israel or…
This is exactly why the threshold should be no uranium enrichment or plutonium production at all for the mullahs. It is crystal clear why this regime in Iran cannot be trusted. Those arguing otherwise most likely have interests in the lucrative deals Western corporations seek to sign with the ayatollahs if sanctions are ever lifted.